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1. The Debate over Patient Capital 
 
This special issue was first motivated by what its co-editors see as a significant 
lacuna in comparative political economy: the absence of a modern comparative 
model of financial markets. CPE, to us, has remained largely stuck with a long-
standing dichotomy between bank-based and financial market-based systems, with 
the implications for varieties of capitalism with which readers of Socio-Economic 
Review are very familiar. The result, however, is relatively limited attention to 
financial markets and financial market actors. There is limited scope to consider the 
heterogeneity of financial market actors, national differences between financial 
markets, or processes of change within financial markets. This blind spot is all the 
more puzzling when set against the extensive study of financial markets across 
other academic disciplines, even if there is rarely a settled view of the attributes 
even of specific investor types (see Deeg and Hardie, this volume, for an overview in 
certain areas).  
 
We seek in this volume to advance towards a CPE of financial markets, and to do so 
we seek answers to questions about patient capital. This issue is distinctive in that 
we consider the provision of patient capital by financial markets. This approach is 
out of line with CPE’s use of the bank/capital market dichotomy, but much closer to 
the view of financial markets elsewhere. In particular, it recognizes a long-standing 
debate in policy circles – dating in the UK, for example, at least to the Macmillan 
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Report of 1931 – as to how financial markets might better provide patient capital 
(see, more recently, the Kay Review 2012). 
Patient capital is nevertheless central to CPE. The conventional view in the 
comparative capitalisms literature is that coordinated market economies (CMEs) 
are characterized by comparatively higher amounts of patient capital provided to 
NFCs.  Patient capital, in this context, is long-term and not normally withdrawn in 
the face of short-term vicissitudes of financial markets or temporary falls in NFC 
profitability or cash flow. For some, such patience would also include a willingness 
to support newer companies with cheap financing in the hope of future recompense 
(e.g., Peterson and Rajan 1995), or to support potentially non-profit maximizing 
NFC goals such as increased market share or stabilizing employment. Specifically, 
patient capital is said to facilitate long-term investment horizons by NFCs and 
greater investment in specific assets.  In turn, patient capital is complementary to 
other institutional domains of the economy, creating the basis for a coordinated 
market economy (CME).   
 
Conversely, in liberal market economies (LMEs) NFCs are presumed to rely more 
heavily on equity and bonds rather than bank loans – which in these countries are 
short-term – for external finance.  Instead of banks monitoring NFC management 
closely, management is monitored (“disciplined”) on an arms-length basis by 
securities markets.  Banks favour voice in influencing NFCs, while investors favour 
exit (Hirschman 1970; Zysman 1983). Because shares and bonds are highly liquid 
and readily traded, this means NFCs are subject to short-term financial pressures to 
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maintain cash flow (to ensure their bonds perform well in secondary markets and 
they are able to borrow further) and deliver high returns on equity (for 
shareholders).  Otherwise, investors will exit: capital is “impatient” rather than 
patient.  Compared to CMEs, then, NFCs make fewer investments in specific assets 
and less long-term investment, including in such areas as worker training. 
 
 Beyond the private returns to long-term patient investment lie public or 
social benefits.  Patient capital is often seen (or assumed) to foster greater 
investment by NFCs in innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001; Jacobs 2011), especially 
in more basic research that may – or may not – lead to a variety of potentially 
saleable products or services, or innovation in product/services with a long-term 
development profile.  While firms capture much of the benefit of innovation, society 
at large reaps positive externalities as well.   Patient capital can also promote 
stability in financial markets and the economy more generally by not selling assets 
into panicked markets, or enabling NFCs to hold on to employees and sustain 
investment in an economic downturn (Hall and Soskice 2001; World Economic 
Forum 2011, 35). 
 
 The motivations of patient capital providers are somewhat underspecified in 
this literature. Three distinct types of patient investors and lenders can be most 
commonly seen: families with ownership control (of either private or publicly-listed 
companies), NFCs with mutual shareholdings, and banks with both blockholdings of 
equity and a long-term lending relationship. For families, the motivations cited vary. 
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As blockholders in publicly-listed firms, they ‘can help themselves to a variety of 
expropriation costs at the expense of minority shareholders’ (Gourevitch and Shinn 
2005, 60; also Roe 2006, 178). Blockholding also reduces agency costs and can be a 
response to social democratic government pressure on managers to favour the 
interests of labour. However, varied other ‘psychological benefits of control’ 
(Gourevitch and Shinn 2005, 110) may also be important, and these may well have a 
positive social dimension.  
 
 The motivation of NFC cross shareholding is likely to be mainly mutual 
support against takeover pressure (although stabilizing production relations is also 
a major goal). For banks both owning equity and making loans, their interests in 
having the loans repaid mitigate against supporting management decisions that 
maximize short term shareholder value (on Japan, Roe 2006, 4; also Aoki 2001). 
Banks therefore use their position as shareholders and board members (and 
through proxy voting) to protect their interests as creditors. Their ability to monitor 
management and maintain a long-term relationship – thereby earning returns from 
activities other than lending (Aoki 2001, 4) – also encourages longer term lending.   
 
 Whatever the motivations for patience, there has been widespread concern 
that it is in decline due to decreases in long-term blockholding ownership 
(Culpepper 2011), a general shift from banks to markets (Van der Zwan 2014; 
Aspara et al. 2014), as well as toward market-based banking (Hardie and Howarth 
2013; Hardie et al. 2013).  The ability of banks in particular to be patient capital 
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providers has eroded, and we are left wondering whether there is now less demand 
or need for patient capital, or whether the decline of patient capital will undermine 
long-term investment and growth. Beyond academics there has also been official 
concern, exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis, around the decline of patient 
capital (World Economic Forum 2011; Kay 2012; European Commission 2013; Bank 
of England 2014). Many of these concerns are related to the rise of short-term 
shareholder value priorities among investors, and have some overlap with parts of 
the broader financialization literature.  However, these official or semi-official 
reports demonstrate a fundamental disagreement with a central premise within 
comparative political economy that patient capital is anathema to market-based 
financial systems. For those reports, market-based sources of finance have a clear 
potential to be ‘patient’. Indeed, the G30 (2013), although as a finance industry body 
it is possibly partial, is far from alone in seeing the future provision of greater 
volumes of patient capital as requiring a decline in the proportion of NFC financing 
coming from banks (see, for example, initiatives from the European Commission for 
Capital Markets Union).  Such reports point to the potential for patient capital 
arising from non-bank financial institutions as sources of loans and equity, notably 
foundations, endowments, venture capital, sovereign wealth funds and particularly 
pension funds and insurance companies. As this special edition notes, there are 
reasons to be cautious about the patience of many of these financial institutions, but 




In this special issue we seek answers to three general questions about patient 
capital. The first is who provides PC, when and how? The contributors answer this 
across a range of investor types, considering both the continued importance of those 
previously recognized within the CPE literature, such as family owners (van Loon, 
this volume; Celo and Lehrer, this volume), and mostly unrecognized potential 
sources of PC in financial markets, such as sovereign wealth funds (Thatcher and 
Vlandas, this volume), angel investors (Harrison, this volume), private equity 
(Klingler-Vidra, this volume), pension funds (Macartney and Sorsa, this volume) or  
investment fund managers (Garratt and Hamilton, this volume).  This list cannot be 
exhaustive, and is only partly added to by Deeg and Hardie’s (this volume) broader 
but shallower analysis. Although the authors find a wide range of potential patience 
(or absence thereof), the conclusion overall is clear: financial markets are a 
potential source of PC, and the bank/market-based distinction is, in terms of PC, 
highly questionable as an analytic framework.  
 
The second question is what does PC do?  CPE’s answer to this question is obviously 
that PC shields NFC management from the short-term pressures of financial 
markets, producing a range of outcomes linked to long-term decision-making. Deeg 
and Hardie (this volume) argue that such outcomes are not inevitably positive (see 
also Davis 2008, 13; Shleifer and Vishny 1997, 742), and they thereby remind us of 
the importance of the complementary institutions of CMEs that jointly produce the 
positive outcomes associated with such economies. Garratt and Hamilton (this 
volume), writing as market practitioners, argue that PC is capital actively engaged in 
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encouraging long-term NFC decision-making. For them, this argument is being made 
in opposition to the impatience of other providers of capital and their various 
advisers, but they join with Dutta and Knafo (this volume) in suggesting that longer-
term NFC decision-making is not simply a matter of managerial autonomy. Van Loon 
(this volume) can perhaps be seen as more optimistic, showing how the patience of 
family equity in Belgium can, in contrast to the less patient owners in the 
Netherlands, ensure long-term outcomes, even where debt providers (in this case, 
market-based banks in the two countries) display similar levels of (im)patience. 
Thatcher and Vlandas (this volume) similarly show how patient equity capital – in 
their case sovereign wealth funds – can support existing corporate governance 
models. 
 
The third question is what institutional conditions support or discourage PC? This 
volume does not attempt to answer this question systematically, but the 
contributors nevertheless offer some interesting and varied answers. Garratt and 
Hamilton (this volume) are the most systematic, and arguably the most pessimistic, 
despite the success of their own firm. They show both how the ‘investment chain’ – 
the intermediaries through which investment funds flow and their advisers – 
creates incentives for impatience, and how the unintended consequences of 
regulatory initiatives have made patience more difficult. Sorsa and Macartney (this 
volume) consider the preferences of business and labour institutions as influences 
on patience, while Thatcher and Vlandas (this volume) explore the changing 
attitudes of recipient business and governments in influencing the welcome given to 
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generally patient sovereign wealth fund investment. Harrison and Klingler-Vidra 
(this volume), meanwhile draw attention to a different institutional condition: the 
liquidity of financial markets. The lack of exit options for angel and VC investors 
often results in ‘patience by default’.  
 
2.  Contribution Summaries: 
Deeg and Hardie develop a general framework to determine which investors, 
whether providers of debt or equity, should be seen as most likely to be patient and 
under what conditions. They define PC as equity or debt whose providers aim to 
capture benefits specific to long-term investments and who maintain their 
investment even in the face of adverse short-term conditions for the firm.  Their 
heuristic for determining patience involves three questions: 1. Is the investment 
(loan) intended to be short or long term? 2. Is the investor engaged with 
management in pursuit of short-term share price performance or creditworthiness? 
3. What is the likelihood of exit because of concerns regarding short-term 
performance? The answers to these questions are used to place various investor 
types on a continuum of relative patience.  
 
As noted, Deeg and Hardie do not see PC as inherently positive. Indeed, they suggest 
that certain unengaged capital, such as most passive funds, is patient, but that we 
cannot assume that the managerial autonomy that results will be used to favour 
long-term decision-making. They avoid normative perspectives. Overall, Deeg and 
Hardie’s framework emphasizes two areas which do not usually receive extensive 
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analysis in studies of financial markets: engagement and loyalty. In addressing their 
second question, they point out that investors that hold securities for extended 
periods cannot be seen as patient if they engage (utilize voice) in order to encourage 
NFCs to prioritize short term share price performance or creditworthiness. 
Empirically, this supports a move away from focusing exclusively on length of 
investor holding periods in favour of considering whether investors engage with 
NFC management, and, if so, in pursuit of what ends. Their third question introduces 
the question of loyalty (Hirschman 1970) and how the cost of exit influences the 
decision to exit, even after engagement has been attempted. In discussing different 
investor types in the context of their framework, Deeg and Hardie emphasize the 
heterogeneity of investors, but also argue that PC can be found in financial markets. 
 
Thatcher and Vlandas introduce us to an investor category with great potential for 
patience, namely Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).  When SWFs rose to prominence 
in global markets in the mid-2000s they typically evoked suspicion and anxiety 
among western government and business leaders.  SWFs were perceived as 
potential instruments of foreign states who might use them to advance political 
goals, with negative consequences for invested firms or states.  There was also more 
general anxiety that global investors were driving financialization and undermining 
domestic institutions designed to balance interests among various stakeholders.  
Examining the cases of France and Germany, Thatcher and Vlandas find that initial 
hostility to SWF investment in both countries turned into a striking embrace and 
courtship of SWF in the late 2000s by a coalition of leading political and business 
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leaders who came to see SWF investment as a means to offset the decline in long-
term patient capital supplied by domestic banks and firms. The dramatic change in 
stance on SWFs was driven by a rising need for equity investment after the Great 
Financial Crisis and the recognition that SWFs were typically “ideal” foreign 
investors who would ask little of NFC management while remaining loyal, holding 
their equity investment for an indefinite time frame.  In effect, then, SWFs as 
‘outsiders’ proved to be valuable members of ‘insider’ corporate governance 
coalitions – welcomed by other patient investors, managers and workers.  Thatcher 
and Vlandas thus derive the hypothesis that domestic coalitions will form in 
coordinated or mixed market economies to welcome foreign capital when those 
investors are both patient and passive.  Through this study they reveal that SWFs – 
now one of the largest categories of institutional investors in global markets – have 
become a major new source of patient equity investment in Western economies 
(even if SWFs also engage in short-term investing), and that financial globalization is 
not incompatible with patient capital. 
 
Harrison considers the patience of business angel investors, individuals who invest 
in very early-stage businesses and use their own business experience to assist the 
development of these companies. In so doing he takes an entrepreneurial finance 
perspective to an area of investing that has received little attention from political 
economy. The paper applies the framework proposed by Deeg and Hardie to assess 
the level of patience of angel investors, and uses Verbal Protocol Analysis (VPA) to 
explore the investment decision-making of a group of 30 angel investors in Scotland 
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and Northern Ireland. His aim is to address two gaps in the existing literature on 
angels: first, a lack of discussion of the intentionality of patience; second, a shortage 
of research on the relationship between attitudes towards exit and portfolio 
characteristics. 
Harrison concludes that the evidence does not support an unequivocal view that 
angel investors are patient, and sees them as frequently patient less by choice than 
‘by default through force of circumstance’. The data suggest that poorly performing 
investments are exited quickly, but crucially in agreement with the investee, and 
that it is moderately-performing investments that are held the longest. This is 
combined with VPA evidence of surprisingly very low focus by angels on exit in 
investment decision-making, but also a view that ‘good investments will always find 
exits’ (Gray 2011). Angels must concentrate on the likely success of the business, as 
this is what will create the opportunity for exit on which successful investment 
depends (although Harrison also notes broader motivations for investment than 
financial returns). 
 
To us, attempting to generalize Harrison’s findings to the broader consideration of 
PC raises some interesting issues. First, he raises the question of a distinction 
between those investors for whom eventual returns from exit is not a concern, and 
those who depend on exit for financial returns (as angels do), but who must accept 
as a condition of their investment the risk of limited options for exit in the event of 
poor performance. This challenges a distinction of patience based on returns from 
exit (presumably signalling an impatient investor) and returns from income 
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(dividends or interest) during the investment, signalling patience. Second, he raises 
the issue of the investee. If the angel and owner/manager of the business agree on 
exit after a short period, should we see this as indicating impatience on the angel’s 
part? Harrison shows that such agreement can be reached relatively quickly. We 
might term this, using Harrison’s approach, ‘impatience by default’, as the angel 
investor has little choice but to accept exit, given her dependence on the 
entrepreneur’s enthusiastic involvement. A conclusion that such actions do not 
demonstrate investor impatience challenges an empirical focus on the actual length 
of investment in determining patience, while also supporting Jackson and Petraki’s 
(2011) view that what matters is whether capital is pressuring managers to be more 
short-term than they would otherwise choose to be. 
 
Klingler-Vidra looks at venture capital, in particular the provision of seed capital, 
and is therefore looking at early-stage investing that is close to that provided by 
angel investors. Her conclusions regarding patience amongst these investors have 
overlaps with Harrison, but also raise additional interesting questions. In particular, 
she raises the issue of motivations for exit. She shows that exit by seed capital can 
take place in the event of changes from the perspective of the investor, but it is not 
short-term change, but rather a conclusion that the business no longer has long-
term potential. Within Deeg and Hardie’s framework, which Klingler-Vidra also 
employs, such exit would not in itself indicate a lack of patience (although Klingler-
Vidra leaves unasked the question of the likely actions of a VC investor in a company 
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in which the long-term outlook is no longer promising, but short-term performance 
is strong). 
 
Klingler-Vidra’s article also indicates a theme that emerges throughout this special 
issue - investor heterogeneity even within broad investor ‘types’.  Klingler-Vidra 
focuses on a particular aspect on venture capital, seed capital, and even here finds 
two very different strategies in the provision of seed capital, which she suggests 
should be seen as having varying levels of patience. One strategy is to have a 
concentrated portfolio, to be heavily engaged with each company and to provide 
follow-on funding as needed. The second strategy or model is to build a large 
diversified portfolio with relatively small initial investments.  These seed funds 
provide significant engagement and follow-on funding only to the subset (if the fund 
has the capacity) of their portfolio firms, namely those companies thought likely to 
perform strongly over to the long-term. For Klingler-Vidra, deeper engagement and 
follow on funding indicate the probability of greater patience by the fund investor 
(though funds may still be equally patient with weak prospects if they hold on to 
them for an equal length of time). She also points to how the development of a (so 
far somewhat limited) secondary market has increased the ability of venture capital 
funds to exit, thereby reducing patience. This supports those who see a link between 
increased financialization and reduced patience. 
 
Van Loon is also interested in change over time and in explaining where patience is 
sustained or eroded. His focus is on outcomes in terms of NFC decisions.  In his 
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article, however, the two case studies, property markets in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, have experienced very different levels of change in patient investment 
over the period examined, and it is this variance he seeks to explain. In both cases, 
the nature of debt finance and of the banks providing it is similar, and his 
explanation lies therefore on the equity side, in the nature of the ownership of 
property companies in the two countries. In Belgium, ownership has remained 
concentrated in family firms, who, despite temptations towards reduced patience 
from their financiers, have maintained a cautious, long-term approach that has 
resisted breakneck expansion and decreased the likelihood of excessive 
development and bubbles. In the Netherlands, in contrast, owners of property 
companies, including subsidiaries of the Dutch banks, have used the availability of 
finance from market-based banks to fund rapid expansion and fuel a pre-Global 
Financial Crisis bubble.  
 
With family ownership remaining so important around the world, this is an 
important analysis regarding NFC demand for, and resistance to the implications of, 
impatient debt finance. It raises the possibility, when the analysis of patient capital 
includes both equity and debt, of understanding variable outcomes even when 
broader financial market developments appear to be similar. As also shown in Celo 
and Lehrer (this volume), blockholders such as family owners can mitigate the 
impact of financial market impatience, not only by not utilizing those financial 
markets (Belgian property development is bank debt-financed), but by resisting the 
pressures it brings. Patient blockholders are, as has been widely argued, particularly 
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influential in this regard. Only when both debt and equity are impatient, or possibly 
when equity has lost its relative influence by greater dispersion, should we expect 
impatient NFC outcomes. 
 
Celo and Lehrer compliment van Loon by delving into the world of German family 
capitalism and find it – perhaps paradoxically – thriving in the face of 
financialization and globalization processes.  Families are widely viewed as the most 
patient (save for states, perhaps) equity investors, particularly when the family is 
both owner and operator of the enterprise.  Families are patient because the 
founder/owner typically operates or controls the firm for their lifetime, and often 
seeks to pass this on to subsequent generations.   Family capitalism is also not 
limited to smaller firms, as many of the largest and most competitive firms in both 
advanced (notably the US, Germany, Italy and France) and developing economies 
are controlled by families.  In Germany, family firms account for more than half of 
employment and expanded substantially in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 
often in stark contrast to the largest publicly-listed firms who collectively shed 
labor. The authors root the success of German family firms in a number of 
institutions; first are inheritance taxes which strongly favor the retention of firms in 
family hands; second is the cultivation of intangible assets or social capital by 
embedding in local communities and production networks; finally, by focusing on 
markets where the social and reputational capital of family firms is a competitive 
advantage, such as capital goods production.  The authors juxtapose the decline of 
relational banking and blockholding in Germany leading to a set of “financialized 
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firms” with the continued robustness of family capitalism.  This leads them to posit a 
‘bifurcation-symbiosis thesis’ in which divergence between the two subsystems – 
financialized listed firms and private family firms – increases the capacity of the 
whole economy to deal with growing complexity in global markets, thus developing 
a new complementarity.   
 
Macartney and Sorsa are interested in explaining what they see as the decline in 
patience amongst pension funds in Finland, the Netherlands and the United States. 
For them, the explanation lies in the interests of business and labour, but 
importantly they do not hold preferences constant, but show how these changed 
over time as a result of financing needs, governance and regulation that varied 
between their three cases and over time. The focus on pension funds is important to 
any overall consideration of the possibilities for financial markets to provide patient 
capital, given their huge size and long-term liabilities. Furthermore, the rise of 
pension funds has often appeared as the underlying development that explains 
increased financialization. Macartney and Sorsa do not address this debate directly, 
but do argue that we cannot consider pension funds as ‘inherently patient’ despite 
the temptation to assume that from the nature of their liabilities. They show the 
changes in the nature of pension fund investments and their move to higher 
turnover, different types of investment and lower patience. 
 
Their analysis has a number of other important implications for the overall 
contribution of this special edition. First, they demonstrate clearly that pension 
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funds can be (even if they increasingly are not) providers of patient capital, and 
their demonstration that preferences on the part of business and labour are mutable 
opens the possibility of changes back towards increased patience. Some might see 
this as a forlorn hope, but Deeg and Hardie point to this possibility in the rise of 
Liability Driven Investment by corporate pension funds (in which long-term 
obligations are matched with equally long-term investments), driven at least in part 
by companies’ increasing aversion to the impact of pension fund funding volatility 
on their profits and balance sheets. Second, regulation is a crucial variable in 
shaping preferences and is arguably under-emphasised across this special issue. 
Macartney and Sorsa show for the United States how regulatory intervention 
blocked union initiatives in favour of patience, for example.  
 
In their contribution, Dutta and Knafo seek the origins of declining patient capital 
in the United States and find them in the changing behavior of NFC management 
rather than changes in bank or investor behavior, as is the conventional wisdom.  In 
other words, they find the decline in the US is driven, at least initially, on the 
“demand” side for patient capital rather than the supply side.  In so doing, they 
remind us that we need to see ‘patient capital more explicitly as a social relation’ 
whose presence and consequences are jointly produced by the interdependent 
behaviour of both investors and management.  They argue it is the rise of 
‘financialised management’ in the US during the 1960s that led to the shareholder 
value revolution of the 1980s and rising short-termism in investment behaviour. 
Only in the 1980s do investment banks become protagonists and disseminators of a 
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shareholder value paradigm focused on short-term returns, and drivers of the LBO 
boom of the 1980s. 
 
Drawing on established corporate historiography, Dutta and Knafo examine the 
behaviour of American conglomerates from the 1960s to the mid-1980s.  They show 
how several conglomerates pioneered financial techniques and corporate strategies 
designed to extract value from acquisitions via cash flow or restructuring and selling 
them to finance further acquisitions.  Most acquisitions were done for their financial 
prospects rather than as part of a longer-term industrial strategy.  The 
conglomerates also used debt - often convertible bonds - to repurchase shares in 
order to prop up share prices. In short, what they call ‘financialized management’ 
entailed both a set of practices and a managerial ideology focused on exploiting 
capital market dynamics and instruments to increase profits.  Their examination of 
this history leads them to conclude that the challenge for fostering patience today 
lies not in increasing the supply of patient investors, but of mitigating the incentives 
and competitive pressures on NFC management that lead them to focus on 
exploiting capital markets rather than productive investment to gain advantage over 
competitors. 
 
Garratt and Hamilton produce a very different kind of paper. Both are partners at 
Edinburgh-based fund manager Baillie Gifford, and their answer to the question of 
whether financial markets can provide patient capital is a simple one: ‘Yes, because 
Baillie Gifford does it’. They were therefore asked to give a highly subjective view of 
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how they see patient capital and the challenges in providing it. Conventional finance 
theory might suggest that, if Baillie Gifford’s view that their patience results in 
superior performance is wrong, they should be out of business; if it’s right, they 
should have displaced the army of short-term investors. Instead, they are over a 
century old, and, although highly successful, are on most measures a medium-sized 
institution. In short, Baillie Gifford operates in an ecological niche that appears, in 
their view, at risk of shrinking. 
 
For Garratt and Hamilton (and in partial contrast to Deeg and Hardie), patience 
requires engagement in favour of long-term performance. They give public 
examples of such engagement that will surprise many readers: calling on Google to 
pay more tax, for example, or supporting a two-tier voting structure that preserved 
a founder’s control and reduced the threat of takeover. Even more important is their 
detailed analysis of the reasons for ‘the loneliness of the long-term investor’. For 
them, the problem lies in the investment chain, the long chain of separate 
institutions through which investment flows, and those institutions (including 
regulatory authorities) that influence different links in the chain. Conflicts of 
interest that mitigate patience exist along the chain; most worrying, perhaps, the 
direction of much recent regulation has had the unintended consequence of making 
it harder to be a patient investor, for example by making effective engagement more 
difficult. Garratt and Hamilton also point out that one reason Baillie Gifford is able to 
be patient is that they are themselves an ever-rarer unlimited partnership, and 
shielded as a result from short-term performance pressures from shareholders or 
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corporate owners. This is an important reminder to comparative political economy 
that financial firms are businesses just as NFCs are, and are therefore subject to 
many of the same pressures from their owners and (although less so for a fund 
management company) lenders. 
 
3. Conclusion 
We would argue that this special issue shows clearly the potential for the provision 
of PC by financial markets, as well as the problematic nature of a dichotomy that 
sees bank-based systems as providing PC and market-based systems as 
characterized by impatience. We believe that accepting this simple point is the 
necessary first step in developing a more appropriate means of distinguishing 
national varieties of capitalism and of identifying processes of change. The work 
here can only be a very small step in that direction, but Van Loon, Klingler-Vidra and 
Sorsa and Macartney all point to important national differences even within 
investors of the same broad ‘type’. Just as Hardie et al (2013) suggest national 
differences within bank-based systems, the work here supports the idea of 
differences within financial markets. Thatcher and Vlandas make a similar point 
regarding the heterogeneity of SWF, but they also show variation in national 
receptiveness to types of international investment. With so many financial markets 
receiving substantial foreign investment, this inclusion of different international 
investors is needed in any complete analysis of national financial and capitalist 
systems (see, e.g., Goyer 2011). 
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A further question raised here concerns the widely-held normative perspective on 
PC. Should it always be seen as beneficial, or only under certain circumstances? 
Indeed, what really are the benefits? We have, in this introduction, been critical of 
CPE approaches, but these questions return us to the issue of institutional 
complementarities on which so much of the comparative capitalism literature is 
predicated. If the periodic attempts by governments, especially in LMEs, to increase 
the availability of PC were to bear fruit, what might be the consequences without, 
for example, increased worker representation in NFC decision making? Answering 
these questions involves the challenge of identifying national differences in the 
nature of financial markets and the actors within them, and relating those 
differences clearly to the outcomes on which CPE has focused. These questions raise 
a further question regarding the direction of causality, which CPE has never 
satisfactorily resolved. Should we see changes in financial markets as driving change 
elsewhere, or financial market change as primarily in reaction to other changes? In 
reality, the answer to this last question must be that both are important. German 
blockholdings develop as a response to worker board representation (Gourevitch 
and Shinn 2005), but shareholder value pressures on bank blockholders may also be 
responsible for them selling down those shares. 
 
One influence appears across a large number of the articles here: regulation. This 
raises a final question worthy of further research: assuming PC is beneficial, how 
might states encourage its provision? This is a complex question which we cannot 
hope to answer here. Garratt and Hamilton are clearly supportive of the Kay 
 23 
Report’s (2012) belief that shortening the ‘investment chain’ would help, but most 
of those involved in the chain serve necessary purposes and many are there as a 
result of regulatory requirements. Garratt and Hamilton also highlight the 
unintended consequences of many regulatory initiatives in terms of PC, while Sorsa 
and Macartney demonstrate the influences on management and labour in favour of 
reduced patience by the largest potential source of PC, pension funds. There 
remains much to be done. 
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